When and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan sat down with Chinese officials in Anchorage, Alaska, for the first high-level bilateral summit of the new administration, it was not a typical diplomatic meeting. Instead of a polite but restrained diplomatic exchange, the two sides traded pointed barbs for almost two hours. “There is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close,” wrote Sullivan and Kurt Campbell, the Administration’s Asia czar also in attendance, back in 2019. How apt that they were present for that moment’s arrival.
A little more than one hundred days into the, there is no shortage of views on how it should handle this new era of Sino-American relations. From a blue-ribbon panel assembled by former Google Chairman Eric Schmidt to a Politico essay from an anonymous former official that consciously echoes (in both its name and its author’s anonymity) George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram” laying out the theory of Cold War containment, to countless think tank reports, it seems everyone is having their say.
“Part of the goal of the Alaska meeting was to convince the Chinese that the Biden administration is determined to compete with Beijingto offer competitive technology,” wrote David Sanger in the New York Times shortly afterward. However, what is mainly uncontroversial is that technology is central to U.S.-China relations, and any competition with China will be won or lost in the digital and cyber spheres. But what, exactly, does a tech-centered China strategy look like? And what would it take for one to succeed?
Tech has brought Republicans and Democrats uneasily together.
One encouragingas one of the few issues on which even Democrats agree that President Trump had some valid points. “Trump was the U.S.-China relations in D.C.,” Schneider, a China analyst at the Rhodium Group and the host of the ChinaTalk podcast and newsletter. While many in the community favored some degree of cooperation with China before the Trump presidency, now competition – if not outright rivalry – is widely assumed. “Democrats, even those who served in the Obama Administration, have Erik Brattberg of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Trump has caused “the Overton Window on China [to become] a lot narrower than it was before,” adds Schneider.
Tech touches everything now – and the future of technology will determine the rest of the twenty-first century.. “Tech and the around tech are really ‘embedded ideology,’’ says Tyson Barker of the German Council on Foreign Relations. “So what tech is and how it is used is a form of governance.” What does that in practice? When Chinese firms expand worldwide, Barker tells me, they bring their norms. So when Huawei in Latin America or Alipay is adopted for digital payments in Central Europe, or Xiaomi takes more market share in Southeast Asia, they are helping digitize those economies on Chinese terms using Chinese norms (as opposed to American ones). The implication is clear: whoever defines the
That shifting balance has focused minds in Washington. “I think there is a strong bipartisan consensus that technology is at the core of U.S.-China competition,” says Brattberg. But, adds Gorman, “there’s less agreement on what the prescription should be.” While the Democratic experts now ascendant in Washington agree with Trump’s diagnosis of the China challenge, they believe in a vastly different approach from theirpredecessors. Out, for instance, are restrictions on Chinese firms just for being Chinese. “That was one of the problems with Trump,” says Walter Kerr, a former U.S. diplomat who publishes the China Journal Review. “Trump cast broad strokes, targeting firms whether Clarity merited it. Sticking it to the Chinese is not a good policy.”